What explains why some authoritarian governments fail to take all the steps they can to preserve their positions of power during democratic transitions? This article examines this question using the example of the leading pro-military party in Myanmar, which lost badly to the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the transitioning elections of 2015. This article argues that a key to understanding how the military failed to perpetuate their power in the electoral sphere resides in their choice of electoral system. In 2010 the military junta chose an electoral system, firstpast-the-post, that was distinctly ill-suited to preserve their power. We explore several hypotheses for why this occurred and ultimately conclude that the military and their allies did not understand electoral systems well enough to act strategically and that they overestimated their support relative to the NLD. This failure of authoritarian learning has important implications for understanding authoritarian politics, democratic transitions, and the challenges faced by authoritarian governments seeking to make such transitions.
This article maintains that a key to unlocking this puzzle resides in the military's choice of electoral system; apparently, they chose an electoral systemfirst-past-the-post (herein FPTP) -that was ill-suited to perpetuate their power. Had the junta chosen a different system when they wrote electoral laws in 2010 (e.g. a proportional representation system, herein PR), they could have preserved their political power much more effectively and securely. Given that they had witnessed both the 1990 general election and the 2012 by-elections (both of which were disastrous for pro-military parties), it is puzzling that the military junta would promulgate a set of electoral laws that would systematically disadvantage their allied party. 3 This article attempts to untangle this puzzle and ultimately argues that the military failed to "learn" two crucial lessons: how electoral systems work and the true level of the military's popularity. On both counts, the following sections show that outgoing autocrats appeared woefully uninformed. This questions some literature about the putative learning capacity and strategic foresight of autocrats. It also suggests in the specific case of Myanmar that elites from the former regime will struggle to adapt to democratic politics for the foreseeable future even while the military retains significant extra-democratic power.
Elections in Myanmar: From Democracy to Dictatorship and Back Again?
For 10 years after independence, Burma was a parliamentary democracy.
However the new democracy proved fragile and the government could not prevent the military from decisively taking control in a coup on 2 March 1962 The 1990 elections, in the retrospective estimation of the Varieties of Democracy project, were the freest and fairest in the country's history between independence and 2014. 6 The SLORC, however, argued that the elections were only meant to populate a constitution-drafting assembly and not to form a government.
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The SLORC, re-shuffled and re-named as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, continued to rule Myanmar for twenty more years as they manipulated and delayed the constitution-drafting process. In 1993 the SLORC created the Union Solidary and Development Association (USDA), which was designed as a regime-supporting mass organization. 8 In 2008, the SPDC held a referendum on the constitution that was distinctly unfree and unfair, with over 93 percent of voters apparently backing a constitution that the vast majority had never read (Human Rights Watch, 2008) . In addition to stipulating emergency powers and a "political leadership role" for the military it also reserves 25 percent of the seats in the National Assembly for sitting military officers. This is a significant number because a constitutional amendment requires a 75 percent legislative majority, thus effectively handing a united military veto power over constitutional changes. The constitution also gives the military autonomy over budgeting, appointment powers to the ministries of Defence, Home Affairs, Border
Affairs, and wide emergency powers latitude.
The 2010 elections were therefore widely expected to provide an electoral gloss to continued military dominance. As the regime attempted to guide the transition whilst retaining power, they sought to use the USDA as the electoral machine for the military and its allies. They therefore renamed and registered the USDA as the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in 2010. 9 The NLD boycotted these elections on the assumption that they would be rigged, but several other parties chose to contest them. The pro-military USDP and National Unity Party (NUP) combined to win over 70 percent of the vote. Together with the 25 percent of seats already reserved for officers, the military and its allies sat in 554 of the 659 seats in Myanmar's national legislature.
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The figure chosen by the legislature to be the country's president turned out to be a moderate reformer. Thein Sein, himself a former general, spearheaded a significant -but not total -political liberalization of Myanmar. By-elections in 2012 to fill seats vacated by cabinet and bureaucratic appointments saw the NLD win nearly every contested seat, with Aung San Suu Kyi herself winning a seat in the legislature.
Yet given that the military still retained so much power, debates emerged about how to characterize Myanmar's political system between 2011 and 2015 and their future beyond that. 11 This stood in contrast to previous scholarship on Myanmar's politics that focused on the sources of the military's authoritarian resilience. 12 It was likely that the military saw a gradual introduction of a constitution and elections as institutionally solidifying its own power and legitimacy. 13 However, the hope of many was that the gradual, regime-led opening could evolve into a "pacted" transition that would establish the foundation for a democratic future.
14 Optimism was tempered by the fact that economic development was weak, 15 armed conflict remained a reality in many parts of the country where ceasefires had not been agreed, 16 the capacity and ideologies of political parties were both weak, 17 and a virulent strain of anti-Muslim Buddhist nationalism stoked violence and persecution of the country's Muslim minority. 
Authoritarian Learning and Electoral System Choice
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of Myanmar's transition away from outright authoritarian rule is the lack of action taken by the military to craft the electoral system to its own advantage when it had the opportunity to do so. Some excellent recent literature has examined Myanmar's current electoral system but it has not linked to questions of authoritarian learning, nor has it been able to present detailed analysis of the 2015 results. 20 The 2015 The election laws promulgated by the SLORC in 2010 were released without significant public consultation and without much by way of explanation, which was typical of the SLORC/SPDC period.
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Previous research on both Western 22 and non-Western democracies 23 suggests that parties will alter electoral systems to benefit themselves and undermine opposition parties. To some degree the context of Myanmar parallels that of European democracies at the turn of the twentieth century, where establishment parties -fearing the threat to their ability to shape policy coming from rapidly expanding socialist parties -adopted PR systems that ensured they would not be totally shut out of power. 24 The ways that votes are translated into seats in FPTP systems are so patterned that previous research has noted the law-like properties of this "mechanical" effect. 25 Had the military/USDP adopted a form of PR, there is evidence to suggest they may have been able to prevent an NLD majority. 26 Not only would PR have guaranteed the USDP seat shares more proportional to its vote shares -whilst reducing the NLD's seat share to less than a majority (after accounting for the military's reserved seats) -but PR might have even reduced the NLD's vote share to less than a majority (further reducing their seat share) by reducing the incentives for voters disaffected with the military to vote tactically for the NLD instead of a more-preferred smaller opposition party.
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In order to pursue this strategy, the military and its allies had to apprehend two pieces of information. First, the military had to understand how electoral systems worked. If they lacked understanding of how different electoral systems operate, then they would be unable to act strategically, and would be unable to adopt the electoral system best suited to their needs. Second, they had to accurately perceive their popularity. If the military/USDP thought they were genuinely popular, they would adopt a majoritarian FPTP system given that the latter has a winner-take-all logic.
However, if the military/USDP thought that they were unpopular they had a choice to make about how best to compete in a democratic context. As Figure 1 illustrates, in order to choose a PR system, the military had to understand both that it was unpopular and how votes are translated into seats in FPTP and PR systems.
Figure 1 about here
Given that Myanmar's military rulers did not choose PR, a disconnect occurred in one or both dimensions of learning during the SLORC/SPDC period.
Autocracies are thought to suffer from weaknesses in procuring and analysing information; they face a fundamentally uncertain environment. 28 In highly repressive contexts, citizens are wary of revealing their true beliefs for fear of repression. 29 To mitigate their information deficits, autocracies turn to mechanisms like citizen complaint procedures 30 or intelligence gathering by secret police. 31 Curiously for the Myanmar case, one way that autocracies are thought to gather information about the preferences of the population and the power of the opposition is by holding elections.
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It is often thought that authoritarian regimes learn not only from their own experiences but also from one another to improve their ability to remain in power. 33 For example, the Burmese military studied the Indonesian military to gain lessons for retaining political power and from 1993 onwards senior delegations from Myanmar visited Indonesia for that purpose. 34 They could also look to examples of other promilitary political parties in the region that successfully refashioned themselves into conservative political parties, such as in South Korea, Indonesia, and Taiwan. 35 Moreover, information regarding the disastrous consequences of other dictatorships failing to adequately perceive their popularity and appreciate differences in electoral systems -as was the case with the communists in Poland 36 -was also readily available.
Why did incumbents in Myanmar seemingly fail to learn? First, the military and its allies may have failed to appreciate the impact different electoral systems would have on the distribution of power (hypothesis 1). For example, they may have thought that the institutional protections built into the constitution were sufficient for them to wield power, or they simply may not have understood different electoral systems. They may have focused more on protecting their own business interests throughout the transition rather than on securing electoral success. 37 If this were the case, then it would have been natural to use the same electoral system that Burma had used in previous elections.
Second, it is possible that information deficiencies during the period of The fact the military and its allies did not succeed in avoiding pitfalls of their own previous electoral experience raises questions about the extent to which the SLORC/SPDC "learned" from their experiences. Political learning is a complex process that is made even more so by the fact that learning and policy implementation are conceptually distinct. 38 Nonetheless, for the purposes of this analysis, it is safe to assume that if the SPDC learned that a different electoral system would have perpetuated pro-military power more effectively, it is highly likely that such a system would have been implemented given the military's unchecked latitude to write and pass legislation before 2011.
Before one can confidently conclude that the military's failure to adopt PR was due either to a failure to understand the electoral system and/or to accurately perceive their own (un)popularity, one must rule out a potentially important alternative hypothesis. The military and/or their allies in the USDP may have recognised that they were not well served using FPTP, but were ultimately constrained by outside influences (hypothesis 3).
For example, the USDP may have been prevented from adopting a PR system that would have benefited them by human rights or other activists keen to ensure that Myanmar's ethnic minorities were not disadvantaged by any electoral reforms.
Myanmar's ethnic minorities are concentrated in certain regions around which electoral districts are drawn. Given the concentration of ethnic groups in certain districts, the number of ethnic groups -and thus the number of parties representing these groups -in these districts would be sufficiently great to make parties representing particular ethnic groups the plurality winner over the USDP's candidates in these districts. As suggested by previous research, 39 parties representing ethnic minorities were able to win more seats under FPTP than under hypothetical PR systems. Given that these parties benefit under FPTP relative to PR, actors outside the military may have been sceptical of any electoral reform toward PR. Because condemnation from ethnic minority rights activists may undermine the military's efforts to attract foreign investment or prestige, the military/USDP may have been constrained from reforming the electoral system.
Empirical Analysis: Untangling Authoritarian Learning in Myanmar
We now turn to assess these hypotheses empirically. To evaluate each, we examine a mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence. Where possible, we incorporate election results to determine whether the data available to the military indicate they were -or should have been -aware of the consequences of their actions regarding electoral system reform. We supplement this data with secondary literature, media reports, and with fieldwork conducted by one of the authors. shares. 40 The exceptions to this rule are parties representing ethnic minorities concentrated in certain regions, who may end up winning larger seat than vote shares due to the fact that their regionally concentrated voter bases make them competitive in these regions. 41 Indeed, even the limited experience of elections in Myanmar shows the FPTP system worked largely as anticipated. This can be seen in Table 1 , which presents the vote and seat shares, as well as the ratio of seat to vote shares, for several parties in the 1990, 2010, and 2015 elections. Higher ratios reflect parties winning proportionally more seats than votes.
The data presented in Table 1 suggest there was considerable information available to the military/USDP to know how FPTP would operate in Myanmar.
Whether the military chose to act on it or study it effectively is a different question, but this analysis shows the evidence was certainly available. As one would expect based on literature regarding the effects of electoral systems, the party winning the most votes won a larger share of seats than would be the case if their seat shares were proportional to their vote shares. Nation-wide parties finishing second or below in the national vote totals generally received substantially less-than-proportional seat shares.
While this effect worked in the USDP's favour in 2010 due to the NLD boycott, it worked against the USDP in 1990 and 2015. In both elections, the NLD won proportionally larger seat than vote shares. The 1990 election is crucial in this regard because the military/USDP could have examined these results as they wrote election laws in preparation for 2010. power and/or came to this realisation too late to alter the system. There is some evidence for both. As mentioned previously, the SPDC, the ruling military junta prior to the 2010 elections, promulgated election laws early in 2010. In a focus group with executive committee members of the USDP, one of whom was a member of the constitution drafting committee, the interviewees admitted that they "did not know much about election systems at that time." 43 However, in early 2013, after the NLD had dominated 2012 by-elections, seven political parties, including the pro-military NUP, supported the idea that the Union Election Commission should change the electoral system to a proportional representation system. 44 The NUP argued that this would create a more inclusive system. Previously in 2012, ten smaller ethnically-based parties had expressed their reservations about FPTP because they feared it would be too difficult to win seats, although not all of them eventually supported the 2013 proposal. 45 At the time, the USDP did not comment and ultimately in November of 2014 the speaker of the house and USDP head, Shwe Mann, announced that the proposal to adopt PR would not move forward because such changes would be unconstitutional (though some have challenged this claim, noting the USDP were not prevented from changing the constitution to their benefit before the 2015 elections). 46 The circumstances surrounding this decision remain unclear, but the NLD did not support the move and several interviewees in Yangon in 2016 recalled that pushing a PR system at that time would have been seen by the NLD as an unfair manipulation by the military and USDP before the 2015 elections. 47 These were also years in which the new government faced many challenges, including peace talks with insurgent groups, and so they may not have had the bandwidth to push through electoral reforms of this magnitude. 48 There is evidence from executive committee members of the USDP suggesting that elites sympathetic to the military became belatedly aware of the consequences of different electoral systems after the 2012 by-election:
"In our country, changing to the multi-party political system [happened] just recently....This is our first experience with the multi-party political system. So, we don't understand very well about those systems: FPTP and PR. When the constitution was created, we followed that new path. So, we only know the widely used FPTP system. When we became MPs, we started to study from different sources. When we visited foreign countries, we started to know about the existence of PR system. Then we realized that there is this kind of system in the world"
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It appears, however, that the military and its allies were too slow to learn the lessons of 1990 and of other FPTP systems -and even then, many did not. It appears many key decision-makers did not learn these lessons and failed to appreciate how PR would operate in a context like Myanmar. Indeed, USDP leaders in the focus group suggested there was no agreement within the party about which electoral system to support:
"Our country is composed of ethnic people, and there are lots of political parties in our country. In western countries, there are only two or three parties. Here, there are over 90 political parties and there are over 100 ethnic groups. When we visited western countries like Germany, we saw the PR system. Then we wanted to start using that system during our five years period. We started to think about whether PR system is suitable for us or not. If we use PR system, small parties can also participate…..But when we do in reality, it's not easy to make changes. Changing the direction of a small boat might be easy but changing the direction of a ship is not easy one. We need to change gradually…..So, we discussed the good points of PR system by comparing the FPTP system in the parliament. But in reality, we are not mature enough. So, some didn't like that system." In sum, the analysis in this section suggests that while there was ample historical, quantitative, and qualitative information available to the military to understand how FPTP would systematically disadvantage the USDP and that the drafters of the Myanmar's new electoral system in 2010 failed to appreciate it. Only after the 2012 by-elections did some pro-military elites seem to belatedly realize that FPTP could lead to a systematic underrepresentation of their party in the legislature. 52 Thus, we take this as evidence supporting hypothesis 1, namely that the military and USDP failed to understand (at least until the USDP claimed it was too late) how electoral systems would impact on their ability to retain power. They appeared to be largely ignorant of how electoral systems operated until at least 2013 even though there was clear evidence on which to draw long prior to that, and certainly before they drafted electoral laws in 2010.
The Military's Estimates of USDP and NLD Popularity
In addition to failing to appreciate how electoral systems function, the military may have underestimated the popularity of the NLD and overestimated the USDP's support (hypothesis 2). Based on the 1990 election results, the USDP had reason to be sceptical of its own electoral popularity (pro-military parties received only about 21 percent of the popular vote in that election). Perhaps, though, the military thought that the legacy of the 1990 election and the NLD's popularity had been effectively purged from the polity considering repression of the NLD as well as the economic and political reforms pursued during this period -and after seeing the USDP's landslide victory in the 2010 election (the NLD boycott notwithstanding).
More recent evidence of USDP popularity levels could be found in the 2012
by-elections, which were held to replace members of the Pyithu Hluttaw (the lower house of the Assembly of the Union) who had left office after the 2010 election -and thus needed to be replaced so as not to leave 37 districts unrepresented for three years prior to the 2015 election. These by-elections were the first free and fair elections since 1990 in which the NLD competed. In 2012, the NLD swept every seat, displacing the previous winner in these districts, which in most cases was a USDP representative. Clearly the NLD's support had not eroded since 1990.
Could Table 2 predicts that the NLD would win between 60.00 and 65.41 percent (found using a 99.9 percent confidence interval) in those districts. This means that the 2012 results predicted the NLD would win at least 60 percent of the vote in the majority of districts across the country.
Table 2 about here
Providing further evidence that the NLD's popularity (and USDP's unpopularity) could be predicted accurately in advance, district-level NLD vote shares in 2015 were in line with the predictions seen in Table 2 . This can be seen in Figure   2 , which presents box plots for NLD and USDP vote shares in 2015. When looking at district-level NLD vote shares in areas where by-elections were held in 2012, Figure   2 shows that the NLD won 60.35 percent of the district-level vote in the median district, which is within the confidence interval predicted by the model in Table 2 above. Even when we expand the boxplot to include district-level vote shares in every state, we see that the NLD won 56.66 percent of the vote in the median district. 53 This evidence shows that one could have predicted with confidence that the NLD would win a majority of the vote in a majority of districts across the countrymeaning that the NLD would win a majority of seats in 2015 under FPTP. As seen in the boxplot in Figure 2 after witnessing the NLD's performance in the 2012 by-elections. Had the military/USDP recognised this, they should have adopted a PR system that would preserve the USDP's power by preventing a NLD seat majority. 54 The fact they did not adopt PR after 2012 suggests many in the USDP still failed to recognise their lack of popularity in the electorate.
This analysis suggests that even if the military/USDP did understand electoral systems, they still may have failed to adopt PR because they did not accurately perceive their popularity. Indeed, in a focus group with USDP officials, the myth of widespread support for the party seemed to persist even after the 2015 elections:
"The general public do not have strong disappointments [about] us, the USDP. When you ask at the grassroots, one day when they [tell] the truth, they will tell you about our good points in which we brought development with full passion for the public in every area of the country...The people know about these….Our senior members might have some flaws...but at the grassroots level, all people still remember that we did greatly for them." Indeed, between 1990 and 2010 the SLORC/SPDC was relatively isolated from Western states and international organizations, particularly in the 1990s.
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Burma joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 and while there was some pressure from member states on Myanmar to democratize, the organization ultimately stayed true to its policy of non-interference. 58 It is therefore likely the military looked to other pro-military parties in Asia who had re-fashioned themselves into successful electoral parties, 59 but there is no evidence that these parties would have pressured the SLORC/SPDC. Myanmar received Japanese aid during this period but it was mostly technical and humanitarian without apparent conditionalities relevant to the electoral system. 60 The constitution drafting procedure was highly circumscribed and controlled by the SLORC/SPDC such that it forestalled not only international pressure, but also domestic input. 61 While there is some evidence of international consultations regarding the electoral system after 2011, 62 there is little evidence to suggest that outside pressure was consequential in influencing Myanmar's choice of electoral system at any point before or after 2010.
Conclusion
The Burmese military and its allies had to understand two pieces of information when they wrote Myanmar's electoral laws in 2010 if they wanted to entrench their power through elections. First, they had to comprehend how different electoral systems worked. Second, they had to appreciate their true level of popularity among Myanmar's population. Understanding both could have led the SPDC to craft an electoral system that helped the military and its allies retain more electoral power after a democratic transition. This article showed that a failure to learn on either one of these accounts could lead to strategic miscalculation on the part of authoritarian leaders.
On both counts, this article found that the military and the USDP failed to apprehend these two crucial pieces of information despite easily available Percentages under votes are the percentages of 'Votes' nationwide; percentages under 'Seats' are the percentages of the total number of seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw; and 'Ratio' is the ratio of seat percentages to vote percentages. Note that column percentages do not sum to 100 due to omitted parties and the omission of the seats held directly by the military. 
